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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
by Susan Cavan  
 
Personnel Matters 
If there is anything more likely to set political wags' tongues, well, wagging, than 
a grand-scale shake-up of major political players, it is the quieter reshuffling of 
little-known, but remarkably influential bureaucrats. When a new policy direction 
is announced to great fanfare, a certain minister or presidential adviser may get 
credit for the initiative, but it is inevitably the staffers behind the scenes who put 
the time and effort into creating the working plan supporting the trumpeted 
"reform". They make their boss look good, or bad, and their status within the 
bureaucracy is often a reflection of their superior's standing within the 
administration. When one of these silent power players falls however, theories 
abound as to its significance in the factional battles for influence. Such is the 
case of Igor Shuvalov. 
 
Shuvalov was, until 28 May, the Government Cabinet's Chief of Staff. He was 
not, apparently, a member of Prime Minister Kasayanov's personal Secretariat, 
but rather the head of a large bureaucratic support structure for the Council of 
Ministers. The nearly irresistible urge to align Shuvalov with the Oligarchs, 
"Family", or Petersburgers, has spurred a wave of often contradictory analyses 
(See, for example, VREMYA, 30 May 03 and VERSIYA, 6-15 Jun 03; both from 
What the Papers Say (Russia) via Lexis-Nexis). 
 
Whether Shuvalov was a scapegoat for the power interplay of rival factions, or, 
more likely, as Chief of Staff fell victim to the Government's main political 
nemesis, the Kremlin Apparat, the fact remains that President Putin removed him 
from his Government post and transferred him into the Presidential 
Administration as an Aide for Administrative Reform: a highly unusual move for a 
staffer given the animosity between the two powerful apparat structures. (This 
animosity, of course, dates back to the early years of the Yel'tsin regime and its 
apparat turf wars). Shuvalov now has basically become a political "hack" prisoner 
in the enemy camp. 
 
There are those who choose to put a rosier spin on this bureaucratic 
maneuvering: Georgi Satarov, Head of the INDEM Foundation is quoted in 
Nezavisimaya gazeta (02 Jun 03 via Lexis-Nexis) as finding "a point" to the move 
in the President's new determination for administrative reform. "[R]eforming the 
government from within is not a very promising endeavor, but in his new position 
[Shuvalov] will have some degree of independence from the Cabinet…." 
 
Perhaps Satarov is correct, although even he questions the chance for a 
"successful result." It seems more plausible however, that some corner of the 
Kremlin Apparat will soon tackle whatever issue had been Shuvalov's pet project 
in the Government, and Shuvalov himself will have no part in the Kremlin's own 
policy process. Notoriety (perhaps of Kasayanov) brought attention to Shuvalov; 
his issue was co-opted by the Kremlin Administration, and Shuvalov himself was 
folded neatly into the Kremlin bureaucracy. It probably has little to do with reform: 
While President Putin continues 
 
Yel'tsin's habit of creating institutions that duplicate the work of existing 
structures, turf wars become more likely, and when political fad turns toward 
administrative reform, the apparatchiks get even more sensitive and protective of 
their perceived territory. 
 
Not so super regions 
 
While administrative reform may be all the rage in Moscow, the once vaunted 
super regions and their special Kremlin representatives seem to be losing their 
luster. At one time, Putin's Kremlin threw its weight behind a streamlined regional 
structure with the creation of special regional units of administration, the leaders 
of which held high-level meetings with the President and, often, the heads of the 
power organs in the Kremlin. These days however, the powerful presidential 
district envoys seem to be drifting away to other work. Viktor Cherkesov, once 
famous for hounding dissidents in the Soviet era, has been re-assigned from his 
supervision of the North-West District and has been tasked with running the 
State Committee on Drug Control. (ITAR-TASS, 07 Jun 03 via Lexis-Nexis). For 
the time being, the Committee will draw its personnel from the Interior Ministry 
and the Tax Police. According to Cherkesov, some 40,000 persons will now be 
involved in Russia's struggle to stem the purchase, sale, and trafficking in 
narcotics. The new Committee, created by presidential decree, comes into force 
on 1 July. It may bear watching what Cherkesov will make of this new agency 
and its broad array of personnel spreading throughout the regions. 
 
Come into my web 
 
We have seen, many, many times before that some appointments seem to be 
made simply to ensure that an inconvenient political figure disappears down a 
bureaucratic black hole, but with dignity! Could that be the case with the newest 
member of the Government, a certain Vladimir Yakovlev, former Mayor of St. 
Petersburg and later Governor of the St. Petersburg region? Putin's displeasure 
with Yakovlev is believed to have developed after Yakovlev replaced Anatoli 
Sobchak as St. Petersburg Mayor in a 1996 election. The dear, departed 
Sobchak, (in current lore, Putin's beloved democratic mentor), was then hounded 
out of the country by corruption probes and ill health, and eventually succumbed 
to heart disease. 
 
With the pomp and ceremony of a State Council meeting as background, 
President Putin awarded Vladimir Yakovlev the Class IV Order of Merit to the 
Fatherland on Monday, and then announced his appointment as a Deputy Prime 
Minister for housing and the municipal sector. (ITAR-TASS, 16 Jun 03 via Lexis-
Nexis) While the appointment may, technically, be seen as a promotion, 
Yakovlev has lost the (shall we politely call it) "personal autonomy" that comes 
with control of such an urbane metropolis as St.Petersburg and all it financial, 
industrial, and tourist ventures. Perhaps he got a car and special driving 
privileges in Moscow in exchange. Whatever the cost, Putin seems to have 
neutralized a dull political ache, and for some reason, Yakovlev seems to have 
accepted the invitation from the spider to the fly. 
 
Yakovlev's presence in St. Petersburg may have felt like a thorn in Putin's side, 
but the appointment of a powerful super regional representative was meant to 
ease that pain. With the above-mentioned Viktor Cherkesov moving along from 
his St. Petersburg watch tower, his successor, Valentina Matviyenko, apparently 
has her gaze set on the now vacant St. Petersburg Governor's seat, in addition to 
her Presidential envoy role. (Unless she knows something we don't yet about the 
fate of the Regional Representatives….) 
 
 
  
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Dullea 
 
Moscow demonstrates uncertainty over the Bushehr project 
 
Amid the excitement of the St. Petersburg celebration and the G-8 Summit in 
Evian, France — the first gathering of world leaders since the souring of relations 
over Iraq — the subject of Iran was a much-anticipated topic of discussion. 
Despite expectations, very little has resulted from those talks except for mixed 
signals from the Kremlin regarding its intention to continue the nuclear power 
station project at Bushehr. Moscow’s dance of the seven veils concerning Iran 
may be a byproduct of conflicting pressures from the Russian nuclear industry 
sector (AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, 4 June 2003 via Johnson’s Russia List 
#7210, 07 Jun 03) and the competing necessities of Russia’s foreign relations. 
Moscow had committed itself to cease nuclear assistance to Iran under the Gore-
Chernomyrdin agreement, but announced suddenly that it was no longer bound 
by that deal. 
 
The Bushehr nuclear power station project was first launched by Germany 
approximately two decades ago but was later abandoned under pressure from 
the United States. In 1994, Iran negotiated completion of the power station with 
Russia for nearly 800 million US dollars. The project is scheduled to be 
completed, and the station should be connected to the power grid, in 2005. 
Nearly 1,500 Russians are currently in Iran working on the construction of the 
plant, but when, or whether, it will be finished remains unclear. Additionally, 
Russian economic forecasts from 2001 and 2002 include the construction of five 
other nuclear power sites in Iran as well as arms sales with the Islamic country 
that are worth over $300 million per year. 
 
The Russians defend their nuclear deal with Iran by claiming that the technology 
they are providing to Tehran would not assist in the production of nuclear 
weapons. The US’s concerns derive, in part, from recent discoveries by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran has developed specific 
technology, which makes it one of only ten nations capable of producing 
centrifuges (a crucial device in the uranium enrichment process). Iran also has 
several undeclared nuclear sites that, for now, are not required to be inspected 
under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 
 
According to Aleksandr Rumyantsev, Russia’s Minister of Atomic Energy, the 
United States fears that Russia’s activities are helping to promote Iran’s scientific 
and technical potential — a worry he claims that "isn’t serious." Furthermore, 
Rumyantsev emphasizes that "Russia is cooperating with Iran only on the 
construction of [Bushehr]… There is no other cooperation in the nuclear sphere 
between Russia and Iran." (EKHO MOSKVY RADIO, 29 May 2003; BBC 
Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
There are yet two unsigned documents between Iran and Russia, which may 
play a key role in determining the fate of their nuclear relationship. The first is an 
agreement for Iran to re-export its spent nuclear fuel to Russia. This agreement, 
which Iran reportedly is ready to sign, has been delayed for what Russia refers to 
as technical, environmental reasons. The second and more contentious 
document is a protocol on inspections by the IAEA of Iran’s undeclared nuclear 
facilities. This agreement, which Iran has refused until now to sign, has been a 
point of some confusion — does Russia consider it a prerequisite to further work 
on the project or is it merely a request put to the Iranians? 
 
The lack of clarity in these negotiations comes from the flurry of sometimes 
contradictory statements from Kremlin officials since the St. Petersburg 
celebration. On 1 June, Putin stated Moscow’s opposition to nuclear proliferation 
and stressed the closeness of Russian and US positions on the Iran issue. On 2 
June, British Prime Minister Tony Blair told reporters that Putin had promised at 
the G-8 Summit to halt all exports of nuclear material to Iran until Tehran agreed 
to sign the protocol. (EKHO MOSKVY RADIO, 3 June 2003; BBC Monitoring via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database) The next day, Russian Foreign Minister, Igor 
Ivanov, emphasized that there was no connection between the signing of the 
protocol and Russia’s continued work on the Bushehr project, although he did 
urge Iran to sign it. He even made an offer to the US to work together on the 
project so that American concerns over its dangers would be relieved — an 
invitation the US refused. 
 
On 3 June, Putin reaffirmed his commitment to continue construction in Bushehr, 
but reiterated the importance of nonproliferation, and restated Russia’s insistence 
that the entire Iranian nuclear program be placed under the control of the IAEA. 
(REUTERS, 3 June 2003 via Johnson’s Russia List # 7207, 03 Jun 03) The 
following day, Russia’s top representative to the G-8 Summit seemed to reaffirm 
this new stance by suggesting that Russia would not continue its nuclear 
construction in Iran until the IAEA gave its approval. 
 
That green light may come in the form of the IAEA’s next report on Iran’s nuclear 
capabilities, which is due on 16 June. However, even here, Russia’s signals are 
blurred as Rumyantsev told ITAR-TASS on 9 June (FBIS-SOV-2003-0609 via 
World News Connection) that he expected the report to contain "hardly anything 
new." Despite downplaying this new IAEA report, Moscow may indeed be 
concerned, as it was reported that the Kremlin has told Iranian officials, that they 
need to provide answers to certain questions about their nuclear program. 
(VREMYA NOVOSTEI, 29 May 03 Johnson's Russia List, 03 Jun 03) In a radio 
interview the former secretary of the Russian Security Council, Andrei Kokoshin, 
stated that there is evidence that Iran has reached a dangerous level in its 
nuclear technology development and that a suspension of cooperation may be a 
wise step. (EKHO MOSKVY, 03 Jun 03; BBC Monitoring via Johnson's Russia 
List, 03 Jun 03) 
 
What is going on inside Iran is only half of Russia’s dilemma — discerning 
America's strategy constitutes the other half. Deep suspicion is being voiced in 
Russia regarding the US’s real intentions concerning Iran. Alexei Malashchenko 
of the Moscow Carnegie Center’s Scientific Council believes that "Iran is part of a 
general American strategy aimed at reconstructing the entire Islamic world." 
(INTERFAX, 02 Jun 03 via Johnson’s Russia List #7208, 04 Jun 03) Others 
attribute the US moves to the fluctuating demands of domestic American politics. 
(VREMYA NOVESTEI, 29 May 03; What the Papers Say via Johnson’s Russia 
List #7200, 29 May 03). 
 
An article in Nezavisimaya gazeta (30 May 03; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) added to the suspicions about US intentions by arguing that 
US troop deployments in Azerbaijan and Georgia are part of an anti-Iran 
campaign, which might provoke Iran to conduct a devastating preemptive strike 
on its two smaller neighbors. Such concerns, the paper concluded, could prompt 
Baku and Tbilisi to join NATO. This type of reporting may promote further 
concerns over the situation, as was pointed out during an interview with the 
Russian Director in charge of construction of the Bushehr power station, who 
highlighted the potential danger in the proximity of US military forces to the 
Bushehr plant. (RTR TV, 08 Jun 03; BBC Monitoring Service via Johnson's 
Russia List, 08 Jun 03) 
 
Why all the obscurity and confusion surrounding Russia’s direction in Iran? An 
uncertain international environment, and questions over the American role in the 
region fuel Russia's domestic policy disputes. One argument for continuing to 
deal with Iran is the economic benefits. Iran, where Russian companies have 
billions of dollars invested, is a major importer of Russian high-tech products, 
machinery and military hardware, making the relationship very costly to abandon. 
Additionally, the nuclear energy lobby in Russia is extremely powerful, (AGENCE 
FRANCE PRESS, 04 Jun 03 via Johnson’s Russia List #7210, 04 Jun 03) and 
with elections looming, the Kremlin may need to consider all the ramifications of 
a decision which might please or disrupt this powerful lobby. 
 
Russia may also be concerned about the influence that Iran wields in the Islamic 
world. Iran has the ability to affect the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and 
influence some Muslim organizations' behavior within Russia. Foregoing this 
nuclear project might result in a lack of access and influence for Moscow in 
Islamic regions at this important juncture in the war on terror and in the reshaping 
of the world's political and economic relationships. 
 
Also important to Russia at this point in time is its relationship with the United 
States. President Putin appears to be attempting to balance all of Russia’s 
interests, hoping to find a way to satisfy them all, but appeasing the US when it 
may bring added profit. There is speculation that President Bush may have 
offered Moscow incentives for its support on the Iran issue, such as access to oil 
fields in Iraq (EKHO MOSKVY, 03 Jun 03; BBC Monitoring via Johnson’s Russia 
List #7208, 04 Jun 03), compensation for Russia’s financial losses if it were to 
give up the Bushehr project, recognition of Iraq’s debts to Russia, and ensuring 
the validity of Iraqi contracts signed with Russian companies. (ARGUMENTY I 
FAKTY, 03 Jun 03; BBC Monitoring via Johson’s Russia List #7210, 04 Jun 03) 
 
While Russia makes up its mind concerning Iran, it appears to have thrown a 
bone to Tehran in the form of two interesting agreements. The first of these is a 
protocol signed 4 June by the Russian Minister of Energy on cooperation in the 
coal industry between Russia and Iran. (EKHO MOSKVY, 06 Jun 03; BBC 
Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database) The second document, which 
ITAR-TASS reported on 6 June, was an agreement signed by the Russian oil 
firm Tafneft with Iran’s national oil research institute to conduct a search for new 
sources of fresh water in Iran, using nuclear magnetic resonance imaging. (ITAR-
TASS, 06 Jun 03; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database) These 
agreements are likely intended to demonstrate Russia’s continued interest in its 
business relationship with Tehran despite the current pause. 
 
If the report threatens to be scathing, Iran may sign the protocol in order to 
forestall further international pressure. This would enable the Russians to 
continue their construction project and keep all of their economic deals intact, as 
well as to maintain their relationship with this key member of the Islamic world, all 
without offending their Iranian business partners by demanding the signature 
themselves. Moreover, the signing of the protocol would be enough, the Kremlin 
hopes, to ease US concerns that Russia is proliferating nuclear weapons 
technology. 
  
 
Domestic Issues and Legislative Branch 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
 
Boris, we hardly knew ye? 
 
Russian politics often concerns personality more than ideology, and that does not 
appear to be changing any time soon. Indeed, attempts by democratic forces to 
merge have been stymied again and again by the inability of YABLOKO leader 
Grigory Yavlinsky and Union of Right Forces (SPS) leader Boris Nemtsov to 
consider even a power-sharing agreement. For a while, Nemtsov seemed to be 
the calmer and more reasonable of the two, but recent events indicate that such 
a perception might require an adjustment. As Nemtsov alienates an increasing 
number of party members, will voter support diminish? 
 
This spring, the SPS appeared to be maintaining its function as a voice of 
opposition to administration human rights policies. As part of the All-Russia 
Democratic Assembly, on 17 March SPS (along with several other "democratic" 
groups) condemned the Russian government’s attempt to hold a referendum on 
Chechnya. "The holding of any referenda in the present Chechnyan conditions — 
‘the mop-up operations, road blocks and settlements by troops, the virtually 
functioning of a curfew’ — all this is categorically prohibited, and for good reason, 
by international norms and Russian law today," the assembly statement read. 
Opponents warned of long-term implications such an "ill-timed and unprepared 
referendum" could have, particularly on the citizens of Chechnya who, forced to 
flee during the war, would be ineligible to participate. 
(WWW.ENG.YABLOKO.RU) Notably absent from the list of signatories were 
YABLOKO, the Russian Joint Social-Democratic Party and the Republican Party. 
(YABLOKO Deputy Chairman Igor Artemev explained that, "In general we 
support the adopted statement, but we think that a peaceful conference must be 
chaired by the President of Russia, as this is the only way to guarantee that the 
decisions adopted at the conference are real and will be implemented.") 
 
Not quite so notable in his absence from the list of signatories, but missing 
nonetheless, was Boris Nemtsov. SPS did sign the agreement, but Alexei Kara-
Murza and Alexander Kotyusov, not its chairman, represented the party. To be 
sure, politicians cannot be everywhere, and the absence of Nemtsov’s signature 
could have meant nothing more than conflicting engagements. However, a more 
startling statement by the party leader puts that assumption in doubt. 
 
Last month Nemtsov came out in support of Colonel General Gennady Troshev, 
a Grozny-born officer who had commanded Russian forces in Chechnya, as a 
candidate for Chechen president. (WWW.CHECHENPRESS.COM, 25 May 03 
via RFE/RL) Last year, Troshev made headlines for refusing to accept a transfer 
from the North Caucasus Military District to the Siberian Military District; he 
subsequently was assigned to coordinate relations between the presidential 
envoys and the Cossacks. (WWW.GAZETA.RU, 26 Feb 03 via America On-line) 
 
Some have seen Troshev as "[Russia's] last well-known, public and popular 
general" and "one of the greatest heroes of the second Chechen war." 
(Jamestown Foundation, RUSSIA AND EURASIA REVIEW, 04 Feb 03) Others 
are more skeptical, given Troshev’s statements on the manner in which the war 
should be conducted. Despite his connections to Chechnya’s capital, he declared 
that the razed city should never be rebuilt, in order to serve as a warning for 
Russia’s other ethnic minorities who might consider secessionist activity. He also 
demanded the public execution of captured "terrorists." (IRISH TIMES, 15 Jan 03 
via Johnson’s Russia List) He had a similar punishment in mind for warlords: "I 
would do this. Gather people in the square, string up the bandit, and let him 
hang, and let everyone see," he said. (PRAVDA, 5 Jun 01 via english.pravda.ru) 
How, then, could he warrant the support from Russia’s democratic camp? 
 In fact, the answer is not evident. In another article, during the same month in 
which Nemtsov purportedly offered his support to Troshev, the SPS leader 
refused to be drawn into a discussion as to who should lead Chechnya. "That's 
for the president to decide. Any name I might suggest now would hurt that 
person's chances," Nemtsov said. (NEW TIMES, May 03 via www.newtimes.ru) 
Indeed, in the same interview Nemtsov reiterated the liberal ideas most have 
associated with the party. "I believe that a combination of a market economy and 
civil rights is just what Russia needs…If one of them is absent, democracy is 
deficient and liberal economy is deficient. It's bad for the country," he explained. 
 
He clearly has not lost his footing in terms of ideology. Thus, the motivation 
behind his purported support of the general is murky. Adages about strange 
bedfellows aside, the juxtaposition of the liberal politician and this particular 
military man do not fit. Nemtsov has made some stands that cause other liberal 
politicians to shudder, but those stands — in support of some government 
measures, which invariably align with SPS’ pro-market philosophy--are not as 
out-of-character as this move is. Indeed, the two generally can be found on 
separate sides of the issue. Troshev often is touted as the prime example of the 
military establishment (even his refusal to disobey an order for a transfer to 
Siberia has been perceived as a power play of the military against the civilians in 
the defense ministry). Nemtsov, on the other hand, is a proponent of military 
reform, and has claimed that President Putin supports military reform but has 
been held "hostage to the secret service and the military bureaucracy." 
(GAZETA.RU, 7 May 03; BBC Monitoring via Global NewsBank) 
 
If Nemtsov has "turned," what other options are there for voters interested in 
seeing Russia’s political system change? The multitude of democratic parties has 
diminished since the heyday of the early 1990s, through a combination of inter- 
(and intra-) party squabbling, voter disaffection with the hardships generated by 
the reform, disillusionment with the reformers themselves (and, often, with the 
oligarchs who funded parties for their own reasons), governmental regulation and 
the occasional murder of leading personalities. Democratic Russia, already 
floundering before the assassination of co-chair Galina Starovoitova in November 
1998, and Russia’s Democratic Choice, unable to pass the five-percent hurdle to 
obtain seats in the last parliamentary elections, voted to disband in May 2001, 
thereby allowing the former SPS coalition to dissolve; most members (with some 
notable exceptions) joined the SPS party. 
 
SPS appears to be the most inclusive of the surviving factions, but the broad 
nature of that very inclusivity could spell the party’s defeat. Begun in 1999 as a 
coalition, and re-formed as a party in May 2001, the Union of Right Forces has 
consistently garnered respectable, but not overwhelming, voter support, 
generally placing fourth in polls behind United Russia, the Communist Party, and 
YABLOKO (and sometimes tying, or barely beating, Zhirinovsky’s so-called 
Liberal Democratic Party). 
 
The issue likely will be who can lead the party. Like the SPS, Nemtsov’s level of 
support regularly has been just adequate for survival. At the May 2001 congress 
at which the party was formed, five chairmen (Nemtsov, Anatoly Chubais, Sergei 
Kirienko, Yegor Gaidar and Irina Khakamada) were selected as part of the 32-
person political council. The position of party leader went to Nemtsov only after 
Gaidar purportedly withdrew from the race; in the end, the vote of support was 
237 (out of 403) — roughly 58 percent of the total. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 13 
Jun 01) 
 
In the past two years, keeping the party intact has been a struggle that has not 
always succeeded. As the party formed, it had to contend with the very public 
disapproval of two noted human rights activists, Sergei Kovalov and (the late) 
Sergei Yushenkov, who opposed the dissolution of their party, Russia’s 
Democratic Choice, and the creation (as well as the program and direction) of 
SPS. (Jamestown Foundation, MONITOR, 21 May 01) Lately, the defections of 
high-level officials has been seen, including the head of the party’s executive 
council, Eldar Yanbukhtin, who quit the party to become the deputy secretary of 
United Russia’s executive council. (The Moscow Times, 6 May 03 via 
www.eng.yabloko.ru ) Moreover, Boris Titenko, the leader of the Rostov Oblast’ 
branch of SPS, recently announced he was leaving the party, accusing Nemtsov 
of choosing personnel on the basis of personal loyalty rather than ability. Titenko, 
a co-founder of Russia’s Democratic Choice, warned that "intrigues and score-
settling, encouraged or directly inspired from the federal center, have replaced 
substantive political work in many regions." (WWW.REGIONS.RU, 25 May 03 via 
RFE/RL Newsline) 
 
While Nemtsov is alienating members, few viable options remain. Most of the 
other leaders of SPS have lost voter support. Kirienko and Gaidar both suffered 
from holding the position of prime minister — Kirienko, during the rouble crisis, 
and Gaidar, after the reforms he instituted began to affect adversely the living 
standards of the citizenry. Chubais, long associated with the oligarchic frenzy 
that resulted from unchecked privatization, is seen chiefly as the leader of a small 
band of recently enriched liberals. (RODNAYA GAZETA, 30 May 03 via 
Johnson’s Russia List) Still, Chubais remains connected with the party — and his 
influence may be increasing once more, given the recent appointment of his 
long-time ally, Alfred Kokh, to manage the SPS campaign for the December 
elections. (The Moscow Times, 6 May 03 via www.eng.yabloko.ru) Gaidar 
remains a force as well. In an interview this spring he hinted that the party needs 
to focus less on big business, and work to attract small- and medium-sized 
business interests. (MOSCOW NEWS, 9 Apr 03 via Johnson’s Russia List) 
Interestingly, that points to the party’s expert on smaller businesses, Irina 
Khakamada. 
 
Khakamada, who has been with the party since its inception, is being seen 
increasingly as the public face of SPS. Along with Nemtsov, she was kicked out 
of Belarus last fall (surely a badge of honor for a liberal democrat). 
(BELARUSIAN TELEVISION, 1200 GMT, 23 Oct 02; BBC Monitoring via Global 
NewsBank) She has hammered out deals with YABLOKO representatives when 
the parties’ leaders could not agree. (RTR, 7 Jul 02 via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) She has also traveled to Kyiv to support Ukraine’s leading opposition 
figure there, Victor Yushchenko. (INTERFAX, 22 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1022 
via World News Connection) 
 
She certainly appears to be a pragmatic politician. In a recent interview she 
offered a realistic vision of the short- and long-term futures of the Russian 
political system. "Everyone is looking for ideal persons, but no one is looking for 
an ideal system. Much further political modernization is being discussed; I think 
that's a waste of time. Nothing will work better. Moreover, things will get worse, 
as we can see from the situation with the mass media and poor progress in the 
development of a civil society. I think in the next ten years we should make our 
political institutions more than just formal, that is, build a real democracy by 
stimulating ideal market legislation, an administrative reform, and a judicial 
reform so that it would be enforced to help citizens exercise and protect their 
rights. Then, in 10 or 15 years we would have a system, which could be called an 
advanced democracy, though perhaps not so perfect in comparison with old 
democracies." (NEW TIMES, May 03 via www.newtimes.ru) 
 
Such a long-term outlook does not present a rosy picture for SPS. "Theoretically, 
our Union must become an opposition party. But we have refrained from doing so 
and are trying to reach an agreement with the present government and help it 
accomplish urgent economic, legislative, judicial, and administrative reforms. We 
shall pay for what we are doing now because it is an ambiguous stand, it is 
impossible to clearly formulate our line. The ratings of our Union and its 
popularity among democrats will go down. The middle class is small at present, 
and we shall not win enough votes. This will come out in the elections," she 
added. 
 
Clearly, with assessments such as these emanating from the party leadership, 
Kokh has his work cut out for him. But there is very little democratic choice left. 
 
 
  
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Maolmordha McGowan 
 
Case closed? 
 
On 30 April the Prosecutor-General’s office announced it had completed its 
investigation into the September 1999 bombings of apartment buildings in 
Moscow and Volgodonsk. Investigators identified Achemez Gochiyaev, the FSB’s 
long-standing prime suspect, as the leader of a band of Muslim terrorists whose 
attacks allegedly claimed 241 lives. Only two minor figures, Yusuf 
Krymshamkhalov and Adam Dekkushev, are in custody and will stand trial. 
Charges pending against them include participation in illegal armed units, 
terrorism, deliberate murder with aggravating circumstances, and illegal 
possession of arms. (ITAR-TASS, 30 Apr 03 via Lexis/Nexis) The two initially 
confessed their involvement, but later claimed those confessions were made 
under physical and psychological duress. During the interrogation, Dekkushev 
fingered Achemez Gochiyaev as the leader of the gang who set the explosives. 
Most of the other suspects, including Denis Saitakov, Ravil Akhmyarov, Timur 
and his brother Zaur Batchaev, have been killed in Chechnya. (RIA-NOVOSTI 30 
Apr 03 via RFE/RL Newsline) Gochiyaev and Khakim Abayev remain at large, 
and may, by some accounts, be hiding in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge. According to 
Russian intelligence sources, the attacks were planned by Chechen rebel leader 
Shamil Basayev, along with Abu-Umar and Omar Ibn al Khattab who were killed 
during counter-terrorist operations in Chechnya in 2001 and 2002. (IZVESTIYA, 
30 April 03 via Lexis/Nexis) 
 Despite the fact that the accused planner and the accused executor of the 
Moscow bombings remain at large, Prosecutor-General Vladimir Ustinov insists 
that the case has been completely solved and all suspects have been identified. 
He also provided a motive, according to which the Gochiyaev group carried out 
the attacks under orders from Basayev to avenge "fallen comrades" from an 
engagement with Russian forces along the Chechen border. (IZVESTIYA, 30 
April 03 via Lexis/Nexis) 
 
The question remains whether closing the official investigation will also curb 
speculation that the FSB itself orchestrated the bombings to provide political 
cover for a renewed Russian campaign against Chechen separatists. (see THE 
NIS OBSERVED 21 Aug 02) Critics have argued that the government’s 
investigation never seriously pursued this possibility. If nothing else, the timing of 
the announcement will raise further suspicion, as it came a mere 13 days after 
the murder of Duma Deputy Sergei Yushenkov, head of an unofficial inquiry into 
the FSB’s possible involvement, (see THE NIS OBSERVED 07 May 03) and at 
the beginning of the long May Day weekend. Deputy Yushenkov had 
occasionally suggested to reporters off the record his personal belief that the 
security services were responsible for the murder of his colleague Vladimir 
Golovlyov, as well as for the Moscow bombings. (VREMYA MN, 19 Apr 03 via 
Lexis-Nexis) One might speculate that in order for the government to claim that 
the case has been solved according to long-standing FSB assertions, the silence 
of Yushenkov and his colleagues was required. However, with the official case 
closed, it seems certain that if Yushenkov and his allies were correct, the 
possibility for justice to be served in this fateful case may have been buried along 
with them. 
 
An old Putin chum gets the nod… again 
 
Yet another former colleague of President Vladimir Putin, Sergei Smirnov, was 
promoted to a high-level post as First Deputy of the St. Petersburg department of 
the FSB on 9 June. During his tenure in St. Petersburg, Smirinov became a close 
friend of Putin’s, and not surprisingly, the President had a hand in promoting his 
former colleague, according to the newspaper, Kommersant. Smirnov previously 
served as deputy chief of the Security Service for the Protection of Public 
Officials, which is also indicative of the level of trust the President has for 
Smirnov. Smirnov's only official public appearance came in a November 2002 
press conference where he surprised everyone (including the team actually 
working on the investigation) with the announcement that the case of murdered 
Duma Deputy Galina Starovoitova had been solved. 
 
The post of chief of the St. Petersburg FSB office continues to be a springboard 
position, as Smirnov’s predecessor, Victor Cherkesov, was appointed from there 
to presidential envoy in the North-West super region, eventually being named 
head of the committee for combating drug trafficking in March 2003. Smirnov’s 
deputy, Major-General Alexander Bortnikov, will replace Smirnov as head of the 
St. Petersburg department. (KOMMERSANT, 09 Jun 03 via Lexis/Nexis) 
 
Several shuffles at the MVD 
 
The Ministry of Interior is preparing to undergo a major services consolidation, 
similar to the recent power build up in the FSB. Interior Minister, Boris Gryzlov, 
told President Putin on 13 May that the MVD’s absorption of the Tax Police is 
proceeding as scheduled and should be completed by the scheduled 1 July 
deadline. The 14,000 employee Tax Police department will join with the 
Economic Crimes Department to form a new agency within the Ministry of 
Interior. (RTR RUSSIA TV via lexis/nexis) 
 
Commander in Chief of Interior Troops, General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, during a 
4 June press conference with his counterpart in Kazakhstan, announced that the 
ministry would procure new hardware for the Interior Troops consisting of non-
lethal weapons. Tikhomirov mentioned further that the final decision on the 
transfer of control of counter-terrorist operations in Chechnya from the FSB to the 
MVD would be made at the end of this year. This is much later than September 
which had previously been the target date in official statements. (ITAR-TASS, 04 
Jun 03 via WNC World News Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Dan Rozelle 
 
Two Defense Industry Executives Killed on Same Day 
 
The top executive of the Almaz-Antei defense consortium, Igor Klimnov, was shot 
and killed on Friday, 6 June. That same day a top official of RATEP, (Radio-
Technical Enterprise), a subsidiary of Almaz-Antei, was also murdered. The 
killings are unique, not only in their timing, but also because one of the victims 
was connected to President Putin's administration. The murder of Igor Klimov, 
who was closely tied to the Kremlin, has generated most of the media attention. 
Klimov, a former aide in the presidential administration, died outside of his 
apartment near the Interior Ministry after a supposed robbery attempt, although 
neither his briefcase nor any of his money was taken. (MOSCOW TIMES, 09 Jun 
03 via Lexis-Nexis) The second man killed, Sergei Shchitko, according to various 
press reports, served as the finance manager and had just recently become the 
commercial director at RATEP. 
 
Numerous theories exist as to why both men were murdered yet all agree that 
the murders are linked and were certainly contract killings. Klimov, a former 
Foreign Intelligence Service (FSB) officer, had been appointed to his position as 
acting general director of Almaz-Antei only last February and was to be 
permanently installed in the post as CEO on 26 June. Previously he was an 
advisor to Viktor Ivanov, also an FSB officer who now serves as both deputy 
chief of administration for President Putin and chairman of the board for Almaz-
Antei. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 09 Jun 03; What the Papers Say via ISI 
Defense and Security Database) The most plausible motive for Klimov’s murder 
stems from his attempts to prevent diversions of profits and other forms of 
embezzlement. In his short time as director, he ousted reputed representatives of 
criminal gangs and fired several plant managers, among them some from 
RATEP. Klimov also persuaded the General Prosecutor’s Office to institute 
embezzlement proceedings against other authorities of the consortium. In the 
most flagrant example, $73 million disappeared from an Antei contract with 
Greece for an air defense missile system. It was later discovered that authorities 
at Antei had placed $45 million in an offshore account in Montenegro and 
another $12 million in a Moscow bank. The remaining $16 million has yet to be 
found. (MOSKOVSKY KOMSOMOLETS, 09 Jun 03; What the Papers Say via ISI 
Defense and Security Database) 
 
Arms sales are one of Russia’s most profitable industries bringing in over $4.8 
billion last year. Although state-owned, many of Russia’s weapons manufacturers 
have effectively become private ventures run by and for the profit of their 
managers. According to Pavel Felgenhauer, a Russian-based independent 
military analyst, arms industry executives have long been skimming illegal profits 
from arms sales to the point that little or none of the money goes to the 
government. The size of the industry, the inability of the government to recover 
the profits, and the secrecy with which the industry sometimes works, has clearly 
attracted the interest of organized crime networks. The creation of the 
government-run defense industry consortiums and the appointment of Klimov 
represented an attempt by Putin to exert Presidential control over the industry 
and make good on his promises of increased law and order. (THE ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, 09 Jun 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Almaz-Antei, one of the defense holding companies formed by decree last year 
as part of Putin's restructuring, brings in between $1 to 2 billion in annual 
revenues and is one of Russia’s largest. (NIS OBSERVED, Vol.VII, No. 17, 30 
October 02) The state-owned organization includes 46 different enterprises 
involved in development and production of all types of air defense systems. 
(VEDOMOSTI, 09 Jun 03 via Lexis-Nexis) One of its most profitable products is 
the S-300 medium-range surface-to-air missile system --Russia’s equivalent of 
the US Patriot system. Difficulties have, however, surfaced in the formation of the 
weapons conglomerate. The individual companies Almaz and Antei were rivals 
before being forced together by presidential fiat, apparently their competition for 
control has continued as the merger progresses. A third company, Oboronitelnye 
Sistemy, oversaw contracts for selling Almaz’s version of the S-300 system to 
China and is also involved in the dispute, though to a lesser degree. (MOSCOW 
TIMES, 09 Jun 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Another factor in the possible motivation behind the Klimov murder is found in his 
attempt to win the right of independent export for Almaz-Antei. Currently 
Rosoboronexport, Russia's state run military arms export company, holds a 
monopoly on exporting weapons and military equipment. Established only two 
years ago, Rosoboronexport controlled 87% of military sales in 2001 and was 
positioning itself to control the remaining portion as well. 
 
On 3 October of last year, however, President Putin met with the government's 
committee for military-technical cooperation and decided that military-industrial 
companies should be able to conduct foreign trade operations and export their 
products independently of one another. (NIS OBSERVED, Vol.VII, No. 17, 30 
October 02) Rosoboronexport's loss of control over Almaz-Antei's foreign sales 
could potentially have an impact of approximately $1 billion and jeopardize a $4 
billion contract with the United Arab Emirates. (MOSKOVSKY KOMSOMOLETS, 
09 Jun 03; What the Papers Say via ISI Defense and Security Database) 
 
The motives behind the murder of Shchitko are somewhat more murky. The best 
explanation is that, as finance manager, he was somehow involved in Klimov’s 
attempts to control corruption at RATEP. RATEP, which produces targeting 
systems for naval air defense systems, was recently awarded a $700 million 
contract for sea-based air defense weaponry; its share in the profits was to be in 
the neighborhood of $50 to $70 million. If criminal organizations, tied into the 
company's management were anticipating a significant cut of those profits, and 
Klimov threatened their "earnings," it could certainly provide someone with a 
motive for murder. (VEDOMOSTI, 09 Jun 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Klimov is perhaps the highest ranking official to be killed and represents the 
latest link in a bloody chain of murders of government officials. Sergei 
Yushenkov, a pro-democracy deputy in the State Duma was assassinated in 
April. He was the ninth deputy to be killed in as many years. His death was 
followed in May by the murders of the Mayor of Troitsk, a Moscow suburb, and a 
regional director for the Yukos oil company. Earlier this month the director of the 
Meyerhold theater center, a large cultural and commercial complex in Moscow, 
was gunned down. The killings show how little Putin has accomplished by way of 
reining in the criminal elements active throughout Russian business and political 
circles and now especially, evident in the very lucrative defense industry. 
(AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 09 Jun03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Nadezda Kinsky 
 
UKRAINE 
 
Of one mind or two (or three or four)? 
 
The leaders of the Ukrainian opposition have repeatedly stated their intention to 
field a single candidate in the presidential elections scheduled for 2004. Using 
the high points of the "Rise Up, Ukraine!" campaign, Yuliya Tymoshenko of her 
eponymous Bloc, Piotr Symonenko of the Communist Party, Alexandr Moroz of 
the Socialist Party, and Victor Yushchenko of the Our Ukraine Bloc, chose the 
opportunity for group appearances and promised, that in the name of a united 
opposition, they would cooperate in the next presidential race. Apparently, a 
single candidate for the whole opposition is to be chosen during the fall of this 
year. However, all observers both from within and without the opposition (and 
even Ukraine) doubt that the opposition grouping--so far apart in politics and 
outlook--will be able ever to decide on a single candidate, let alone fight a joint 
election campaign. 
 
President Leonid Kuchma himself, in a statement on May 28th, has voiced 
doubts that the opposition forces will be able to field a candidate to oppose his 
candidate (he himself cannot run for re-election according to the constitution). He 
aimed his remarks primarily at Yushchenko, politically the strongest of the 
opposition figures, who decided to stay in the opposition in the Rada in 2002, a 
move which Kuchma suggests was a grave mistake (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 29 
May 03). 
 
The opposition leaders themselves also have revealed their own doubts on 
whether this project will succeed. Symonenko has long declared his willingness 
to see his name appear on the ballot paper. Yuliya Tymoshenko also recently 
criticized the failure of the opposition to move forward on plans for a single 
candidate and announced her willingness to run for President if a common 
candidate is not put forward. She made her statements to the Kyiv weekly 
"Zerkalo nedeli" in its first June issue. As a reason for her frustration, she 
mentioned Yushchenko's hesitancy to sit down and actually discuss the concrete 
measures needed to establish a joint opposition campaign. Yushchenko, 
however, in an interview with Radio Free Europe on the occasion of its 50th 
anniversary, dispelled such doubts and reiterated the plan for a common 
candidate. As the most popular politician in Ukraine at the moment, Yushchenko 
can, and presumably does, assume that he would be this joint candidate, 
although he vehemently denies this presumption by saying that, "We want to 
avoid the situation where a navel, or a bright sun, is placed in the center, and 
everybody else will have to join it." (RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report 
10 Jun 03) 
 
All of these preparations take place, of course, in the assumption that the 
presidential elections indeed will be held undisturbed in 2004. Kuchma has 
already announced that year as the next date for elections. However, shards of 
doubt hang over the election preparations because of the parliamentary reforms 
scheduled for the same time. Kuchma suggests that presidential and 
parliamentary elections should be held in the same year, which would extend his 
term until 2006. His main concern, after all, remains his ability to retain immunity 
from prosecution for as long as possible. Concern is growing among international 
groups that the upcoming presidential elections will not be held in a free and fair 
environment. Observers from the OSCE and other organizations are preparing to 
monitor the electoral preparations, but based on the conduct of the 2002 
parliamentary elections and recent local elections, there is a real fear that there 
will be a continued decline in electoral standards evident since the previous 
presidential elections. In recent polls, over half of Ukrainians answered that they 
did not believe it possible to have free and fair elections in Ukraine. 
 
 
BELARUS 
 
Sign here "For a Worthy Life" 
 
President Alexandr Lukashenka is currently at an all time low in popularity with 
the Belarusian population, voices of dissent are growing, and several calls for 
reform have been heard. At the same time, governmental crackdowns on what it 
considers its most dangerous enemies, the media and NGOs, are growing more 
intense. A group of Belarusian lawmakers is now trying to use a procedure 
provided for in the constitution to amend the electoral system in order to make 
the Belarusian legislature more effective. 
 
The recently established political group, "For a Worthy Life," organized and 
supported largely by the Respublika group of parliamentary opposition politicians 
together with some other well-known figures in Belarus, are soliciting 450,000 
signatories for their petition to introduce several amendments to the electoral 
process. According to the tenuous legislation, if a considerable contingent of the 
population appeals, in writing, to the government in order to make changes such 
as promised by "For a Worthy Life," lawmakers are obliged to amend the law. 
However, it is highly unlikely that even if the group manages to find the 
necessary number of signatories to the petition among a highly apathetic 
population, the president and the government will so easily accept this mode of 
amending legislation. A vote in parliament is most likely to be lost by the 
Respublika group, which has only 12 deputies in the parliament with 110 seats. 
 
The amendments proposed by "For a Worthy Life" all are suggestions that are 
bound to displease Lukashenka deeply. For one, they recommend giving more 
powers and freedom to the international election observers who so far have all 
found Belarusian elections to be undemocratic and unfair. Given Lukashenka's 
problems with the OSCE missions in particular, the chance that he would accept 
such a change in official Belarusian legislature is highly unlikely. The OSCE itself 
has already stated its support of the move by the Belarusian lawmakers (RFE/RL 
Newsline 29 May 03). Other amendments proposed also strengthen the 
opposition and weaken the power of Lukashenka and his cadres. According to 
"For a Worthy Life," election candidates should have the right to finance their 
own election campaigns; and it also holds that the Central Election Committee, 
responsible for running elections and referenda in the country, should undergo a 
large-scale reorganization particularly of the appointment procedure for its 
members, which so far has been carried out solely by the president and the 
upper house of parliament. As IWPR's Belarusian Reporting Service points out 
however, the problem lies not only in the adoption of these changes to the 
legislation, but more importantly, in the implementation of the law: "Our electoral 
code is not one bit less democratic than most equivalent documents in Europe. If 
there are any problems, they are in the area of implementation," said Central 
Election Committee secretary Nikolai Lozovik to the service (IWPR's Belarus 
Reporting Service 30 May 03). 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
GEORGIA 
 
Parliament speaker visits DC 
 
Speaking at the National Democratic Institute on 10 June, Nino Burjanadze, the 
Chairperson of Georgia's parliament called on the US government to "emphasize 
all the time that we should have free and fair elections." According to Burjanadze, 
"if Georgia loses its democratic image, it will lose legitimacy internally and 
internationally." Burjanadze was speaking a week after the Georgian opposition 
staged a mass rally in Tbilisi calling for implementation of the law governing the 
composition of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) which was passed in 
2002. According to the law, every party represented in parliament should also be 
represented in the CEC. (Press Release of New Rights Party, 03 Jun 03) The 
government, however, refuses to give up control of the CEC, particularly of the 
district commissions which count the votes. 
 
The June 3rd rally alarmed many observers when some of the participants 
started calling on President Eduard Shevardnadze to step down. Burjunadze, 
who supports the demands of the opposition with regard to the CEC composition, 
took pains to distance herself from this radical demand. She said that 
Shevardnadze should not step down and voiced support for his international 
orientation. In particular, she pointed out that Russia's policies in Abkhazia and 
South Osettia (such as breaking Georgia's transportation blockade and issuing 
passports to residents of the two separatist Georgian regions) constitute grounds 
for Georgia to sever relations with Russia. Moreover, increased US involvement 
in settling the Abkhaz crisis would be in order because Moscow has had a 
monopoly on security issues in the South Caucasus for a long time and yet has 
not managed to bring about peace or stability. 
 
CHECHNYA 
 
Independent newspaper resumes publication 
 
Grozninskii rabochii was founded in 1917 and published consistently until 2002, 
except for the years of the deportations, 1944 to 1956. It became an independent 
newspaper in 1991 and was sponsored by the Soros Foundation. During the first 
two years of the present war, the paper was printed in Ingushetia, but in the 
summer of 2001 editor Musa Muradov started receiving threats and ceased 
publication in 2002. After a year of false starts, the paper resumed publication in 
March 2003. Now Grozninskii rabochii is being printed at the Izvestia publishing 
house in Moscow and has a circulation of 10,000 copies. 
 
The content is an indicator of how many restrictions there are on a paper which 
focuses on and circulates in Chechnya. Unlike the liberal Moscow press such as 
Moskovskie novosti, Kommersant or Novaya gazeta, Groznenskii rabochii charts 
a very cautious course. For instance, the first issue for March 11, published the 
full text of the new constitution and pretended that the normalization of conditions 
in Chechnya is imminent. 
 
Nevertheless, the paper presents authentic Chechen voices and discusses tough 
social issues from the perspective of the victim. The March 11 issue also 
contained a long article about psychological trauma among Chechen children 
and cited a study by the World Health Organization which found that 86 percent 
of the children surveyed in Chechnya had some kind of de viation from the norm. 
This compares with a 60 percent rate for children in the Chernobyl disaster zone. 
 
The April 11 issue reported on the catastrophic infection rate of tuberculosis. The 
disease is spreading rapidly as men who became infected in detention are 
released without treatment, and then transmit tuberculosis to their families. 
Another article in the April issue describes how a woman is trying to reclaim her 
apartment in one of only three buildings in Grozny that have been restored. The 
building was privately owned by the tenants who had themselves worked on the 
construction of the site in the 1980s. The building was destroyed in two wars, but 
was recently rebuilt to attract refugees from Ingushetia. Now, a police cordon 
prevents the owners from reclaiming their apartments because other refugees 
were settled there arbitrarily. Another article contains excerpts of letters from 
recent immigrants which give a glimpse into the complexities and travails of 
obtaining a foreign passport for travel outside Russia, foreign visas, and political 
asylum in various European states. 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
 
Confusion as Election Looms 
 
Presidential elections in Azerbaijan will be held on 15 October, with several 
registration deadlines fast approaching. Candidates must be registered between 
July 1 and August 16; by 17 July the Central Electoral Commission must be 
formed; and by 5 September the district electoral commissions should be in 
place. The official campaigns may begin on 16 August. (Zerkalo, 13 June 03) 
The political elite is still deciding whether to back the current president Heyder 
Aliev or his son Ilham. The opposition also remains fractured among several 
potential candidates. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Joel Hafvenstein 
 
TURKMENISTAN 
 
Time nearly up for ethnic Russians 
 
Ten years ago, the Turkmen and Russian governments signed a protocol 
agreeing to give ethnic Russians in Turkmenistan dual citizenship — a measure 
which, at the time, seemed to be in Turkmenistan’s interest, as it checked the 
exodus of educated, politically experienced citizens across the Caspian, and 
gained Russian approval as well. On 22 April, however, the autocratic Turkmen 
President, Saparmurat Niyazov, declared the era of dual citizenship over. Dual 
citizenship holders were given a mere two months to decide between keeping 
their Russian or Turkmen passports. Niyazov justified this policy by denouncing 
"scoundrels" and organized criminal elements who had taken advantage of dual 
citizenship to flee Turkmenistan or launder money through Russia. (INTERFAX, 
23 Apr 03 via www.times.kg) 
 
This unilateral repudiation of the 1993 citizenship agreement has disrupted an 
unusually constructive period in Russian-Turkmen relations. In early April, the 
two countries negotiated a 25-year deal on the purchase of huge quantities of 
Turkmen natural gas, at a price which would allow Russia to maintain low gas 
rates for domestic consumers while preserving its own, more expensive reserves 
for export to Europe. Niyazov apparently extracted Putin’s consent to a 
revocation of dual citizenship — a process Putin seems to have assumed would 
take place gradually, during the negotiation process. Niyazov’s deadline and rush 
to proceed with the approval of his rubber-stamp parliament has left many 
Russians (in both Moscow and Turkmenistan) stunned and furious. Dmitri 
Rogozin, Foreign Affairs Chair of the Russian Duma, has accused the Turkmen 
President of planning a "mass deportation" of Russians, and darkly alluded to 
Turkmenistan’s formerly cordial relations with the Taliban as further reason to 
sanction Niyazov’s regime. (EURASIANET, 05 Jun 03 via www.times.kg) 
 
As the 22 June deadline approaches, the Russian consulate in Ashgabat has 
been swamped by ethnic Russians frantically seeking exit visas. (ITAR-TASS, 
1248 GMT, 09 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0609 via World News Connection) 
Turkmenistan has a population of 4.7 million, of which an estimated 6.7 percent 
or 315,000 is ethnic Russian (WORLD FACTBOOK 2002 via www.cia.gov); 
nearly 100,000 of these Russians hold dual citizenship. This group is 
disproportionately represented among Turkmenistan’s business, bureaucratic, 
and technical elites. They now face the dilemma of either renouncing their 
Turkmen citizenship and probably losing their jobs and assets, or renouncing 
their Russian citizenship, along with their "exit privileges," and being irrevocably 
isolated from the outside world. 
 
Despite Turkmen assurances that the interests of former Russian citizens "will 
not be infringed" after 22 June, Russia is resisting the end of dual citizenship. It 
has declared that it will continue to "regard Russians living in Turkmenistan as its 
citizens and give them legal support until national procedures related to the 
renouncement protocol are complete." (INTERFAX, 1003 GMT, 09 Jun 03; FBIS-
SOV-2003-0609 via World News Connection) Meanwhile, Rogozin has met 
pointedly with Turkmen opposition figures to confer on the "problems" of 
Turkmenistan and Russia’s interests in the region. (INTERFAX, 0912 GMT, 09 
Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0609 via World News Connection) 
 
Niyazov’s motives for repudiating the dual citizenship law and antagonizing 
Russia are not entirely clear. He laid the blame for an assassination attempt on 
his life in November on a number of opposition leaders in exile, several of whom 
enjoy dual citizenship. (See NIS OBSERVED, 04 Dec 02) This may be yet 
another attempt to cripple that opposition. It might also merely be another stage 
in Niyazov’s general efforts to isolate his country from any outside influences, 
leaving only his bizarre and ever-expanding cult of personality to fill the void. 
Former Russian citizens might, for example console themselves by reading yet 
another recently published volume of the President’s verse, which inveighs 
against the three great social vices of "satiety, bragging, and internal disputes." 
(INTERFAX, 1507 GMT, 30 May 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0530 via World News 
Connection) Niyazov, by his awkward and rushed handling of the issue has 
ensured that both internal and external disputes over dual citizenship will linger 
well after 22 June. 
 
Both expansion and repression accelerate 
 
The violent Islamic movements of Central Asia were physically and 
organizationally devastated by the 2001 American invasion of Afghanistan. Last 
summer, the seasonal attacks of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) into 
the Fergana Valley were notably absent, and 2003 has seen few signs of the 
group’s revival. The states in the region are trying to take this opportunity to 
crush the purportedly non-violent but equally radical Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), an 
Islamist organization that tirelessly propagandizes against the existing regimes in 
favor of a new trans-national Caliphate. Unlike the IMU, however, HT has 
flourished in the wake of American intervention. The prisons of Central Asia 
contain exponentially more HT members than they ever contained IMU guerrillas 
or al-Qaeda terrorists. 
 
On 5 June, Tajikistan sentenced an HT activist to 14 years in a penal colony for 
anti-state activity, including distributing "Wahhabi" literature and "actively 
advocat[ing] the idea of turning the Central Asian countries into an Islamic state" 
— the twenty-third such arrest this year. (INTERFAX, 1106 GMT, 05 Jun 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0609; INTERFAX, 1106 GMT, 05 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0606 
via World News Connection) On June 6, Russian security forces detained 55 
alleged members of an HT cell in Moscow, complete with explosives, detonators, 
and grenades. (ITAR-TASS, 1723 GMT, 09 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0609 via 
World News Connection) Meanwhile, Kyrgyz security officials warned that HT 
was expanding rapidly throughout their country — not just the Fergana Valley as 
before, but into the north. (INTERFAX, 1130 GMT, 24 May 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-
0524 via World News Connection) 
 
It remains an open question — one of the most important in the region — 
whether this ever-expanding movement has resorted to violence as a means of 
bringing about its utopian Caliphate. The Russian discovery of a heavily-armed 
cell would suggest so; the FSB security services see this as evidence that HT 
seeks to implement "gradual Islamisation by using such methods as forcible 
introduction of shari'a forms of government, initially in Uzbekistan and 
neighbouring countries, and then in Russian regions populated mainly by 
Moslems." (ITAR-TASS, 1723 GMT, 09 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0609 via World 
News Connection) It is curious, however, that in Central Asia there is still no clear 
evidence of HT embracing "forcible" means of introducing shari’a. Ideologically, 
HT professes the idea that only a Caliph could authorize militant jihad. 
Strategically, HT has sought to advance its cause by widespread dissemination 
of propaganda rather than violence. (See Jihad, by Ahmed Rashid, 2001) It has 
kept its distance from jihadi groups with which it has some areas of sympathy, 
such as the IMU and the Chechen rebels. 
 
A Kyrgyz official recently repeated the long-standing government claim that 
"numerous facts suggested connections between the fanatic extremists and 
terrorists," in particular the discovery of Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflets in illegal arms 
caches. However, he admitted that "no explicit evidence of this group's 
involvement in terrorist acts committed in Kyrgyzstan has been obtained." (ITAR-
TASS, 1257 GMT, 10 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0610 via World News 
Connection) Overall, despite a turn toward anti-Americanism since the war in Iraq 
began (see NIS OBSERVED, 23 Apr 03), and despite a clear ideological affinity 
with certain violent groups, there is still little evidence that Hizb ut-Tahrir has 
turned to violence as the means of its opposition to the present state structures. 
As such, the governments of Russia and Central Asia should consider whether 
repression of HT is really advisable: there is a significant danger of creating a 
self-fulfilling definition of HT as a terrorist organization. 
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